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State Dept. review completed

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ATTACHMENT B

6 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Chief, Management Staff
SUBJECT: Replies to Questions Posed by Director of Communications in
His Memorandum Dated 21 February 1958, Regarding Staffing
and Ceiling for OCI Communications Center

1. Question A: What were the operational reasons causing the extensive
(over 100%) increase in cable traffic within a period of
about one year?

Answer to Question A: The extensive increase in cable traffic
of the OCI Communications Center is attributable principally to an
increase of 300% in the volume of traffic received from the National
Security Agency from July 54 to March 58. Sample, volume figures
are as follows: (by groups)

<u>July 54</u>	<u>July 55</u>	<u>Jan 56</u>	<u>March 58</u>
298,168	235,001	512,407	1,010,104

The increased volume results from substantial technical
and operational improvements in NSA's ability to collect,
process and distribute special intelligence. Because OCI is
responsible for receiving special intelligence via electrical
means and disseminating same to other CIA components, the
volume of traffic transmitted to FI/DD and OSI over this same
period increased substantially. For example, volume trans-
mitted to FI/DD was as follows: (by groups)

<u>July 54</u>	<u>July 55</u>	<u>Jan 56</u>	<u>March 58</u>
82,296	107,157	122,456	1,116,000 (estimated)

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2. Question B: What efforts were made to obtain additional ceiling in support of the programs that caused the traffic increase?

Answer to Question B: No efforts were made by OCI to obtain additional ceiling for its Communications Center for two reasons:

1. During the period of these volume increases, ceilings of DC/I Offices were being reallocated, and OCI's ceiling was reduced approximately 13.5%. This reduction made it impossible for the Office to supply additional ceiling in support of the Communications Center interest without endangering the Office's ability to produce intelligence.

2. The feasibility of Office of Communications taking over operation of OCI's special intelligence communications facilities has been under consideration since January 1956. Pending solution of this question, no attempt has been made to increase the Comm Center Staff on a permanent basis. However, personnel, including an OCI clerk-typist and OC personnel, have been assigned on a temporary basis to assist in the Comm Center and the CIA Watch Office has been filling in gaps in the Comm Center schedules.

3. Question C: Since the Cable Secretariat does not review the OCI cable traffic, what internal procedures are in effect to assure that traffic volumes are held to a minimum?

Answer to Question C: The Chief, Support Staff, OCI is directly responsible to the AD/CI for management of the Comm Center and for reviewing the traffic volume continuously to ensure that only that which is highly significant is handled via electrical means. He reviews virtually all messages to be transmitted by the Comm Center to insure their proper and authorized release, and to determine that they should be transmitted electrically. In addition, CIA Regulation [redacted] states as policy that electrical communications are to be used only when the time factor clearly dictates the need for use of this facility. This regulation states that special intelligence cables may be sent to authorized recipients only when released by a releasing official designated by the Assistant Director for Current Intelligence.

As an example of the measures taken to reduce the traffic volume in the Comm Center, messages received for OSI after normal working hours are delivered by courier the next morning instead of being held for teletype distribution during the regular working day.

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It is our opinion that the volume of traffic handled by the OCI Communications Center is closely policed and is kept at the lowest possible figure, despite developments in the many critical international situations which result in sudden upsurges of traffic volume.

4. This confirms the original OCI comments to your questions furnished the Management Staff March 18, 1958.

/signed/

MONTGOMERY B. SHELDON
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence